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The trade-oﬀ between capturing terrorists and, by this action, possibly creating
new terrorists, may be analysed based on models such as the following one. The
probability of a (random) person being a "free terrorist" equals that of a person
being a "terrorist" multiplied with that of a "terrorist" being "free"; formally, P("free
terrorist")=P("terrorist") × P("free" | "terrorist"). To reduce this product, the
policy should reduce both factors. Cause-related policies reduce P("terrorist") by
reducing people’s inclination towards terrorism, involving measures such as raising
the standard of living. Symptom-related policies reduce P("free" | "terrorist") by
detaining terrorists. But symptom-related policies also aﬀect P("terrorist"), through
(desirable) deterrence and (undesirable) "hate eﬀects" on people’s inclination towards
terrorism. If "hate eﬀects" dominate over deterrence, more toughness overall increases
P("terrorist"), possibly overcompensating the reduction of P("free" | "terrorist").
This and other models point towards a new method for analysing terrorism policy
choice.
The political debate about terrorism prevention is dominated by two seemingly
opposed worries: "How can we prevent people from becoming terrorists?", and "How
can we neutralise the threat coming from existing terrorists?". Each question seems
legitimate in its own right, yet the answers that they suggest appear to point into
diﬀerent directions. While the ﬁrst goal suggests a policy that removes the causes
of terrorism, the second goal suggests a policy that ﬁghts terrorists. Can a policy
meet both goals at the same time? And which of two policies is better if each one is
superior to the other with regard to one of the goals?
A model about terrorism prevention should ideally address both goals. If it ad-
dresses only one goal, it may favour a policy that achieves this goal at the expense of
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the other goal: The policy may achieve a high "capture success" while creating even
more new terrorists, or create few terrorists while leaving society entirely exposed to
them. The purpose of this paper is to present a general method for modelling the
combination of both goals. This method consists in
(a) selecting a single objective function that simultaneously reﬂects both goals;
(b) decomposing this objective function into "inclination parameter(s)" that rep-
resent (the degree of) inclination towards terrorism (ﬁrst goal) and "neutralisation
parameter(s)" that represent (the degree of) neutralisation of terrorists’ power (sec-
ond goal) (and possibly other parameters such as policy cost parameters; see Section
1.1);
(c) separately estimating policy eﬀects on each of these parameters;
(d) deducing the overall policy eﬀect on the objective function.
While steps (a) and (b) are a question of model choice, step (c) is surely the
most demanding one. Although it is desirable that such an estimation be backed up
by empirical data, the limits of a purely statistical estimation will be pointed out.
To illustrate the method (a)-(d), I shall apply it to a particularly simple objective
function in (a) and decomposition in (b). The objective function to be minimised is
simply the number of free terrorists, and the decomposition explains this quantity in
terms of a single inclination parameter, the overall number of terrorists,a n das i n g l e
neutralisation parameter, the detention rate or proportion of detained terrorists.2
Surely, this macro-model is very simple, but it seems well suited for illustrating the
general method. (A more elaborate decomposition will also be discussed.)
The diﬀerence to game-theoretic models. Unlike most other technical models,
this model (that is, the simple example illustrating the method (a)-(d)) is not game-
theoretic. While game-theoretic models ask what (rational) actions are made by given
terrorists (and governments), my model will ask (among other things) whether and
when a person becomes a terrorist in the ﬁr s tp l a c e—s ot h eq u e s t i o ni sn o th o w
policies aﬀect a person’s (strategic) actions given "terroristic" preferences, but how
policies aﬀect the preferences in the ﬁrst place.3 While game-theoretic models ignore
the question of the formation of "terroristic" preferences or motives and focus on
minimising the damage created by given terrorists with these preferences, my model
will ignore the diﬀerent (and diﬀerently damaging) actions of terrorists and focus on
reducing the number of terrorists in action. So, the diﬀerence is that, of the two goals
mentioned earlier, my model also addresses the ﬁrst one but is less elaborate on the
second one. This diﬀerence might be the source of why game-theoretic models often
suggest rather tough policies, while my model perhaps suggests a rather cautious
policy response. It would be an interesting challenge to combine both approaches by
modelling policy eﬀects on both preferences and actions, i.e. both whether people
develop terroristic motives and if so what action they take. This could for instance be
2The word "terrorism" will be used as a purely technical term to denote a non-governmental use
of force or violence against human or non-human targets. Related words ("terrorist", "terroristic",
...) are used accordingly. Since these are deﬁnitions, and not claims, I do not intend to take a stand
in the controversy of what terrorism is and who is a terrorist in a non-technical sense.
3At ﬁrst sight, one is tempted to compare "(not) being a terrorist" in my model with "(not)
performing terroristic actions" in a game-theoretic model. However, a substantial diﬀerence is that
the non-terrorist does not like, say, the plane to crash, while the terrorist prefers the plane to crash
but may for strategic reasons opt to leave the plane in safety. Formally, terrorists and non-terrorists
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achieved by using the method (a)-(d) with neutralisation parameters some of which
reﬂect the power of terrorists in action.
Structure of the paper. I shall illustrate (in Sections 1 and 2) and assess (in Section
3) the general method (a)-(d) by means of the simple example indicated above. More
precisely, in Section 1, I present a general taxonomy of policies, and policy eﬀects on
the level of inclination (towards terrorism) and neutralisation (of terrorists’ power).
In Section 2, I focus on symptom-related policies, and discuss the typical eﬀects of
their toughness level on the level of inclination and neutralisation. For instance,
I argue that inclination is often a U-shaped function of the toughness level of the
capture policy: Inclination is high both for very low and very high toughness, due
to too little deterrence resp. too strong a hate eﬀect. In summary, the analysis
will suggest that, typically, the capture policy should be not very tough and length of
detention not very short. In Section 3, a methodological assessment of my approach is
presented: Is it justiﬁed to decompose the objective function and estimate separately
policy eﬀects on each inclination and neutralisation parameter, rather than estimating
at once policy eﬀects on the objective function? The answer, I argue, depends on
the estimation method. Often, a purely statistical estimation is impossible, so that
the estimation has to be theory-based, founded on (ideally empirically/statistically
tested) arguments on the causal mechanisms creating policy eﬀects. This approach
does indeed beneﬁt from a decomposition, which cuts a complex estimation problem
into more manageable ones.
The relation to the literature. To position the model (i.e., the simple illustration
given of method (a)-(d)) relative to the literature, let me ﬁr s tn o t es o m eg e n e r a l
characteristics of it. The model is a macro-model: It considers the a population as
a whole rather than modelling the behaviour of single persons (although the model
m a yt os o m ee x t e n tb eb a c k e du po nt h em i c r o - l e v e l ) .F u r t h e r ,t h ea n a l y s i sIg i v eo f
the model is theoretical rather than statistical, yet not game-theoretic, resulting in
qualitative, not quantitative, claims and policy recommendations.4 By contrast, the
formal literature on terrorism often takes a game-theoretic or statistical approach;
and it typically focusses on a recent event or a particular policy choice problem,
whereas my model is general. However, none of these characteristics of my model are
necessary features of models following the method (a)-(d).
This paper may be considered either, in view of the speciﬁct o p i c ,i nt h ec o n t e x t
of the terrorism literature, or, from a methodological point of view, in the context
of mathematical and probabilistic modelling in political science. Regarding the spe-
ciﬁc terrorism literature, my model is little related to previous models or methods
by the above remarks. Some of the previous studies take a mainly political and so-
ciological approach; e.g. Dumas (2002), Wulf et al. (2003). Other studies derive
policy recommendations based on economic arguments (e.g. Congleton (2002), Frey
and Luechinger (2003)), or on game-theoretic modelling (e.g. Brophy-Baermann and
Conybeare (1994), Pape (2003), Sandler et al. (1983), Sandler and Enders (2002)).
From a methodological perspective, the parameters of my model may be interpreted
as macropolitical variables describing the state of society with regard to terrorism.
This relates to an approach to political science borrowed from economics, promoted by
Cioﬃ-Revilla (e.g. Cioﬃ-Revilla (1998, 1998a, 1985), Cioﬃ-Revilla and Starr (1995)).
4I.e., I shall discuss the direction in which — but not the exact extent to which — policies aﬀect
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Here, the state of society is represented by a set of macropolitical variables (e.g. im-
migration rate, social cohesion measures, duration of a coalition, time of a terrorism
attack, number of terrorists, etc.), the interactions between which are analysed. Vari-
ables may be exogenous or endogenous, more or less easily measurable (observable),
and more or less easily predictable. The macrovariables of the present analysis are
of the mostly non-measurable type, since terrorists try to appear as non-terrorists.
More generally, there is a growing literature in political science that, like this pa-
per, has a probabilistic motivation. Recent examples are probabilistic approaches
to the discursive dilemma (e.g. Bovens and Rabinowicz (2001), List (2003), Pettit
(2001)); more traditional examples are the probability of cyclic collective preference
(e.g. Jones et al. (1995), Tangian (2000)), and approaches to epistemic democracy
from the Condorcet jury theorem (e.g. Grofman and Feld (1988), List and Goodin
(2001)).
1 A model of cause-related and symptom-related poli-
cies
I begin, in Section 1.1, by introducing more formally the simple model used to il-
lustrate the general technique (a)-(d). I then mention the diﬀerent types of policies
and policy eﬀects on the parameters of interest (Section 1.2), followed by some com-
ments about the endogeneity of the number of terrorists (Section1.3) and a heuristic
comparison between the potential of cause- and symptom-related policies (Section
1.4). Optimal polices in my model are formally deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n1 . 5 .I nS e c t i o n1 . 6 ,
alternative decompositions of F are discussed, to illustrate the broader scope of the
method (a)-(d).
1.1 A simple objective function and its decomposition
I assume that a terrorism prevention policy or just anti-terrorism policy has to be
devised by some governmental or supernational body or organisation. The terror-
ism threat arises from (known or unknown) members of a given group of people.
This group may be deﬁned geographically, ethnically, economically or in any other
way.5 The group may consist of part or all of the domestic population (national
anti-terrorism policy), or contain foreign population (international anti-terrorism
policy), perhaps even the world’s entire population (beside the policy-makers and
-implementers). Throughout, the words "person", "individual" and "people" refer to
p e r s o n sf r o mt h a tg r o u p . T os i m p l i f y ,a ta n yg i v e nt i m ee a c hp e r s o ni si na n yo n e
of the following three possible states "non-terrorist"," detained terrorist",a n d" free
terrorist", without further reﬁnement. Note that, by assumption, non-terrorists are
never detained. Policies have causal eﬀects on people’s states, which I shall explore.
For instance, a tough capture policy increases the probability that terrorists are de-
tained; and it may or may not increase the overall number of terrorists depending
on whether deterrence or hate eﬀect dominates. Each policy leads to a certain group
composition (or group structure) given by the proportion taken by each of the three
subgroups. This group composition can be given two interpretations: For the ﬁnite
5Of course, the group may change over time, due to births, deaths, migrations, etc.Franz Dietrich, February 2004 5
time horizon interpretation, it is the group composition as given after the policy has
been in action for a given ﬁxed period of time (e.g. after 5 years); for the (long-term)
equilibrium interpretation, it is the (equilibrium) group composition to which, ceteris
paribus, the policy has a tendency to lead to in the long run.
The objective function. By assumption, the only policy goal is to6
minimise the resulting number F of free terrorists,
regardless of how the rest of the group is split up into non-terrorists and detained
terrorists. Note that the strategy of reducing F t o0b ys i m p l yc a p t u r i n geverybody
is excluded since non-terrorists are, by assumption, never detained.7 Further, note
that this objective function neglects two important aspects:
1. It neglects costs of anti-terrorism policies, including "costs" of human lives
(on all sides), ﬁnancial costs, costs of quality of life (due to restrictions of individual
liberties, military presence, etc.). In what direction does this distort the picture?
In the case of capture policy, since all of these costs plausibly seem to be increasing
functions of the toughness level, their additional inclusion into the objective function
would lead to a less tough optimal capture policy. In this sense, my objective function
is biased towards higher toughness of the capture policy. So, insofar as my analysis
will suggest a little tough capture policy, this conclusion would get further reinforced
by including costs.8
2. It neglects that the terrorism threat need not be proportional to the number
of free terrorists. This neglects that some terrorists may be more dangerous than
others, that a critical number of terrorists might be necessary to execute certain large
attacks, and that terrorist networks play an important role; and, last but not least,
it neglects what game-theoretic models focus on, namely that a free terrorist may be
more threatening given certain policies than given others.
Decomposition of F. The perhaps simplest decomposition of F explains F by two
factors: overall number of terrorists and detention rate. To explain, let the group’s
composition (in response to the policy) be given by the number of free terrorists F,
the number of detained terrorists D, and the number of non-terrorists N; the overall
number of terrorists is then the sum T := F + D, and the detention rate is the ratio
R = D/T = D/(F + D). The minimand F can be expressed in terms T and R:
F =( 1− R)T,
6This is the same as minimising the proportion resp. probability of free terrorists, as done in the
abstract. For ease of exposition, however, I prefer to talk in terms of absolute numbers rather than
proportions resp. probabilities.
7In principle there are two ways to exclude undesired solutions such as "capturing everybody":
Either the minimand is deﬁned so as to become large on the undesired policy "capture everybody" —
w h i c hi sn o tt h ec a s ef o rF but would be the case if costs were included — or, as I prefer to do here,
the decision space of allowed policies is a priori restricted so as not to contain certain policies (such
as "capturing everybody") and the minimisation is then performed within this restricted domain.
8Including costs means minimising not F but the sum F
0 := F + C where C denotes costs of all
sorts (measured in a suitable unit to justify adding C to F). To apply the method (a)-(d), one has
to decompose the new objective function F
0. A decomposition of F
0 may be obtained as the sum of
a decomposition of F (e.g. (1 − R)F) and a decomposition of C (i.e. a sum of the diﬀerent types of
costs). One then has to estimate policy eﬀects on each inclination, neutralisation, and cost parameter
of the decomposition of F
0. My analysis of F can be viewed as a contribution to the study of the
ﬁrst term, F, of the ("true") objective function F
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because F =( F/T)T where F/T =( T − D)/T =1− R. This decomposition shows
exactly how, by inﬂuencing the detention rate R and the number of terrorists T,t h e
policy may inﬂuence the number of free terrorists F. Note that the relation F =( 1−
R)T is perfectly equivalent to the probabilistic relation P("free terrorist")=P("free"
| "terrorist")P("terrorist") mentioned in the the abstract.9
1.2 The diﬀerent parts of an anti-terrorism policy
Given the aim of minimising the number of free terrorists F =( 1− R)T, let us call
"anti-terrorism policy" the collection of all measures that aﬀect one or both of T and
R (and thereby aﬀect F). Since F =( 1− R)T is increasing as a function of T and
decreasing as a function of R, it is desirable in principle (but hard to achieve) that
the policy simultaneously makes number of terrorists T small and detention rate R
large. I subdivide an anti-terrorism policy into the cause-related policy which aﬀects
only T and the symptom-related policy which aﬀects both R and T (Figure 1).10
cause-related or
proaction policy
symptom-related or response policy
(capture policy & punishment policy) (capture policy & punishment policy)
number of terrorists T detention rate R
number of free terrorists F = (1-R)T (to be minimised)










































Figure 1: Causal eﬀects of both parts of an anti-terrorism policy on T and R, and
hence on F.
The cause-related policy. This part of an anti-terrorism policy consists of all
measures aiming to reduce people’s inclination towards terrorism (except through
deterrence, which is part of the symptom-related policy described below). Such mea-
sures are proactive rather than responsive: They try to prevent people from being
terrorists in the ﬁrst place, without helping to capture existing terrorists. So they
reduce the number of terrorists T without aﬀecting the detention rate R (by the "ide-
alising assumptions" below). Such measures may consist in raising the standard of
living, ﬁghting poverty, improving the level of education, etc. If the group includes
population of foreign countries, the cause-related policy may include the kind and
extent of political and economical relations maintained with these countries, the kind
9After dividing both sides of F =( 1− R)T by the group size m (= N + F + D), the rela-
tion becomes F/m =( 1− R)(T/m), where F/m is the proportion of free terrorists or probability
P("terrorist"&"free"), T/mis the proportion of terrorists or probability P("terrorist"), and 1−R is
1 − P("detained"|"terrorist")=P("free"|"terrorist").
10The names "cause-related" and "symptom-related" are not meant to express an a priori bias in
favour of cause-related policies.Franz Dietrich, February 2004 7
and extent of development policy in the case of third world countries, and so on.
The symptom-related policy. This part of an anti-terrorism policy is responsive
rather than proactive: It consists of all measures aimed at reducing or "neutralising"
the threat of terrorism once there are terrorists. A reasonable subdivision seems to
be into the "capture policy", i.e. the kind and extent of eﬀorts to capture terrorists,
and the "punishment policy", i.e. the kind and extent of punishment of captured
terrorists, in turn subdividable into length of detention and conditions of detention.
(Given the sole aim of minimising F, I neglect the "defence policy" against attacks,
examples of which are defence installations on the roof of a skyscraper and the US
plans of a "missile defence shield".) Crucially, the symptom-related policy aﬀects both
detention rate R and number of terrorists T ( F i g u r e1 ) .T h et y p i c a le ﬀects on R and T
are analysed in Section 2. To anticipate, more toughness typically increases detention
rate R; and whether it reduces or increases people’s inclination towards terrorism and
hence the number of terrorists T depends on whether deterrence or the hate eﬀect
dominates. If the group is or belongs to the population of the domestic country, the
s y m p t o m - r e l a t e dp o l i c yi sd e t e r m i n e db yf a c t o r ss u c ha st h ek i n da n de x t e n to fp o l i c e
presence and control (capture policy) and the judicial system (punishment policy).
In an "international anti-terrorism policy", the capture policy might include secret
services, military support given to certain governments, or military interventions; a
current example of punishment policy is the intended creation of an international war
crime tribunal.
Idealising assumptions. This and the following analysis is based on an idealisation
or simpliﬁcation of the real world in which "everything aﬀects everything", and often
in a number of complex ways. This idealisation is that, by assumption, number of ter-
rorists T reﬂects only the group’s (degree of) inclination towards terrorists, and that
detention rate R reﬂects only the (degree of) neutralisation of the terrorism threat.
Of course, this is not to say that T and R reﬂect all information about inclination
resp. neutralisation — for instance T does not tell how much inclined the diﬀerent
age groups are —, and so T and R are only certain ways of summarising inclination
resp. neutralisation into a single quantity. The idealisation is that T summarises in-
formation only about inclination, and R information only about neutralisation. Such
assumptions are not implausible, but a close look at them reveals that they are far
from cogent.11 So, a non-idealised analysis would have to consider eﬀects of the cause-
related policy on detention rate R, and eﬀects of the symptom-related policy on T
in addition to deterrence and hate eﬀect. But a better strategy, if the idealisation is
considered as problematic, is probably to choose a diﬀerent decomposition of F (see
Section 1.6).
1.3 Endogenous number of terrorists
As mentioned earlier, models of terrorism prevention diﬀer, among other things, re-
garding whether they treat the number of terrorists as exogenously given (as in most
11Here is a counterexample for R. Imagine that a certain policy leads to a higher inclination
(towards terrorism) among young people, and let me show how this raises the detention rate R.
Given that the average age at which a person becomes a terrorist is lower, the average terrorist passes
a longer proportion of his or her "life as a terrorist" in prison (assuming that captured terrorists are
d e t a i n e df o rt h er e s to ft h e i rl i v e s—al o n g e rp e r i o df o ry o u n g e rc a p t u r e dt e r r o r i s t s ) .T h i sr a i s e st h e
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game-theoretic models) or as endogenous and inﬂuenced by the policy (as here). If the
number of terrorists T were in fact exogenous, there would be neither the possibility
of a cause-related anti-terrorism policy, nor a reason to worry about "side eﬀects" of
a symptom-related policy on the number of terrorists, of the form of deterrence and
hate eﬀects. In the product F =( 1− R)T the term T would be a constant, so that
minimising F would reduce to minimising the ﬁrst factor 1 − R, i.e. maximising the
detention rate R — which would clearly suggest a tough capture policy. But this paper
treats T as endogenous and hence rejects 1 − R (resp. R)a sa no b j e c t i v ef u n c t i o n .
The reduction of each factor 1 − R and T is important in its own right and deserves
full attention as a policy goal.
1.4 The relative potential to reduce the number of terrorists T and
increase the detention rate R
One might already now wonder where the potential of reducing the number of free
terrorists F is higher: Is it through increasing the detention rate R (by a tougher
symptom-related policy) or through lowering the number of terrorists T (by an im-
proved cause-related policy and a "well-tuned" symptom-related policy, as argued
later)? No easy answer is possible, but a heuristic argument points towards a high
potential of reducing T. The argument is that the proportion of terrorists varies dra-
matically between societies: It may easily be ten, hundred or more times higher in
societies with a high level of instability, poverty and "brutalisation", such as Somalia
or the Gaza Strip, than in relatively stable and peaceful societies such as France and
the United States of America. By contrast, such variations are unrealistic for the
factor 1−R.G i v e nt h a tT seems more variable than 1−R, the potential of reducing
number of free terrorists F through reducing T might exceed that through raising R.
For example, a raise of R from, say, 0.4 to, say, 0.7 (although possibly involving a
permanent worldwide pursuit of terrorists) implies, for ﬁxed T, no more than a drop
of F =( 1− R)T from (1 − .4)T =0 .6 × T to (1 − .7) = 0.3 × T, i.e. a drop by 50%.
1.5 Optimal policies
For later purposes I need to introduce some notation and formalise the policy choice
problem as deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n1.2. An anti-terrorism policy is a pair (χ,σ), where χ
denotes a cause-related policy and σ denotes a symptom-related policy. Let χ be the
set of all cause-related policies χ considered, and σ the set of all symptom-related
policies σ considered. Recalling that the detention rate R is aﬀected only by the
symptom-related policy σ, while the number of terrorists T is aﬀected by the entire
anti-terrorism policy (χ,σ) (Figure 1), I denote by
- R(σ) the detention rate for symptom-related policy σ,
- T(χ,σ) the number of terrorists T for anti-terrorism policy (χ,σ),
- F(χ,σ)=( 1− R(σ))T(χ,σ) the number of free terrorists F for anti-terrorism
policy (χ,σ).




F(χ,σ), resp. (1 − R(σ∗))T(χ∗,σ∗)=m i n
(χ,σ)
{(1 − R(σ))T(χ,σ)},
where in these minima (χ,σ) ranges over the set of all considered anti-terrorism
policies, i.e. over the set χ × σ (of all pairs (χ,σ) where χ ∈ χ and σ ∈ σ)i ft h e
choice of χ and σ do not constrain each other, and some subset of χ × σ in the
presence of (budget) constraints.13
Narrower choice problems. In practice, however, one is rarely confronted at once
with the simultaneous choice of the entire anti-terrorism policy (χ,σ), partly because
choice problems come "bit by bit" and responsibilities for diﬀerent policy parts lie
in diﬀerent hands14. First, consider the (still very large) problems of choosing just
the symptom-related policy σ ∈ σ, or just the cause-related policy χ ∈ χ.W h e n
just σ is chosen, χ is ﬁxed, and hence F and T are functions of σ only; by deﬁnition,
symptom-related policy σ∗ ∈ σ is optimal if it minimises F(σ), i.e. if12
F(σ∗)=m i n
σ∈σ F(σ), resp. (1 − R(σ∗))T(σ∗)=m i n
σ∈σ{(1 − R(σ))T(σ)}. (1)
Correspondingly, when choosing just χ, then σ is ﬁxed, and so I now drop the de-
pendence of F,T,R on σ;b yd e ﬁnition, cause-related policy χ∗ ∈ χ i so p t i m a li fi t
minimises F(χ), i.e. if12,15
F(χ∗)=m i n
χ∈χ F(χ), resp. T(χ∗)=m i n
χ∈χ T(χ). (2)
Now assume the choice problem refers to only some part of the symptom- resp.
cause-related policy, for instance the length of detention of captured terrorists, or the
size of prison cells, or the size of troops in an occupied country, or the amount of
development aid for one particular country, all of which are only subcomponents of
σ resp. χ. For ease of notation, I still use the symbols σ and χ for policy options
(and the symbols σ and χ for decision spaces) even when the decision concerns only a
subcomponent of the symptom- resp. cause-related policy. For instance, a σ ∈ σ may
stand just for a possible length of detention, and a χ ∈ χ just for a possible amount
of development aid for one particular country. With this notation, an optimal policy
is still given by the condition (1) resp. (2).
1.6 Excursion: some alternative decompositions of F
The method (a)-(d) is not restricted to the decomposition F =( 1− R)T.I nf a c t ,a
disadvantage of this decomposition is that policy eﬀects on T and R may be complex
and not fully transparent, hence hard to estimate (if the estimation is theory-based).
12More comprehensive optimality criteria would include costs, as mentioned in the introduction.
13There may, for instance, be the budget constraint of a certain maximal sum-total amount of
money spent on the policy pair. Then certain policy pairs (χ,σ) ∈ χ × σ are excluded, since for
instance the choice of an "expensive" χ requires that of a "little expensive" σ.
14Capture policy might be inﬂuenced signiﬁcantly by the ministry of defence, punishment policy
by the ministry of justice, and cause-related policy by the foreign ministry and the ministry for
development policy.
15Here the factor 1 − R is not needed on both sides of T(χ
∗)=m i n χ∈χ T(σ) since 1 − R is
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One may consider other decompositions of F as superior in which F is expressed
(explained) in terms of inclination and neutralisation parameters that are easier to
analyse than T and R. For instance, in one of the dynamic models in Dietrich (2004),
the equilibrium number of free terrorists is found to be given by16
F =
manf
afn + afd + anf + b + anfafd/b
, (3)
where m is the group size, b is the birth rate, and anf,a fn,a fd are, respectively, the
frequency of non-terrorists becoming free terrorists, of free terrorists (re)becoming
non-terrorists, and of free terrorists becoming detained terrorists, i.e. being captured.
The parameters anf,a fn,a fd describe the amount of "ﬂow" between the three categories
of people, and, more precisely, the percentage of persons moving from one category
to another per time step (year, month, etc.). afd plays the role of "neutralisation
parameter" (like R) since it reﬂects how many free terrorists are captured in a time
step; so that afd is aﬀected by the symptom-related policy σ only: afd = afd(σ).
anf and afn play the role of "inclination parameters" (like T) since they reﬂect how
many people decide in a time step to become terrorists resp. to re-become non-
terrorists; so that anf and afn are aﬀected by the cause-related policy χ,a n db yt h e
symptom-related policy σ through deterrence and hate eﬀect: anf = anf(χ,σ) and
afn = afn(χ,σ). Note that, not surprisingly, F is decreasing as a function of afd
(reﬂe c t i n gt h a tm o r ec a p t u r e sl o w e rF) and increasing resp. decreasing as a function
of anf resp. afn (reﬂecting that higher inclination towards terrorism raises F). The
potential advantage of the decomposition (3) over the decomposition F =( 1−R)T is
that policy eﬀects on anf,a fn,a fd may be easier to analyses than those on R,T. For it
may be more transparent how particular levels of inclination/neutralisation (created
by policies) translate into particular values of the parameters. But the decomposition
F =( 1− R)T is much simpler, and hence chosen here for illustrating the method
(a)-(d).
Instead of the equilibrium decomposition 3, one may also choose a ﬁnite-time-
horizon decomposition expressing the number of free terrorists F after, say, ﬁve years,
in terms of the parameters anf,a fn,a fd, m and b, and, in addition, the initial numbers of
free and detained terrorists. Further, the model may be made more complex by using
an (equilibrium or ﬁnite-time-horizon) decomposition of F in terms of more or other
inclination and neutralisation parameters than anf,a fn,a fd, for instance additional
parameters adn and adf by allowing that detained terrorists are released from prison.
2 The symptom-related policy and its toughness level
In this section I exclusively consider the choice of (some part of) the symptom-related
policy, and more precisely of the toughness level of the latter. I begin by introducing
the term "toughness level" (Section 2.1), which allows to consider the parameters
F,T,R as functions of the toughness level (Section 2.2). Then, I discuss the typical
shape of these functions (Sections 2.3 and 2.4), with resulting policy recommendations
summarised in Section 2.5. In Section 2.6, two stereotypical cases are discussed, in
16The formula contains no "adn"a n d" adf" since it assumes among others that captured terrorists
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which minimising F =( 1− R)T essentially reduces, in the ﬁrst case, to minimising
the ﬁrst factor 1 − R, achieved by maximal toughness, and, in the second case, to
minimising the second factor T, achieved by creating a climate in which inclination
towards terrorism is minimal.
2.1 Toughness level
For the sake of numerical representation, let us assign to each policy σ ∈ σ an u m e r i c a l
value τ = τσ ∈ R representing the "toughness level" of that policy, where a tougher
policy is, of course, assigned a higher toughness τσ.S o m ee x a m p l e s :
- If the choice is that of the length of detention, toughness τ of the policy might
be deﬁned as average number of years a captured terrorist is detained.
- If the choice relates to conditions of detention, toughness τ might, depending on
the speciﬁcc h o i c ep r o b l e m ,b ed e ﬁned as the number of hours of work per day per
detainee, or as minus size of prison cells in square meters (a "minus" because smaller
cells should be assigned higher toughness τ), etc.
- If the choice is that of the amount of airport controls, toughness τ might be
deﬁned as number of airport controllers, or number of security checks per passenger,
or overall time the security check takes per passenger, etc.
- If the choice is that of the amount of military presence in an occupied country
with the mission of locating terrorists, toughness τ might be deﬁned as number of
soldiers stationed, or as ﬁnancial costs of the military presence, etc.
As explained below, to justify using a unidimensional toughness measure τ Ih a v e
to assume a suﬃciently narrow policy choice problem, for instance one of the men-
tioned ones, but probably not the problem of choosing the entire symptom-related
policy. (Otherwise, I would have to use a multi-dimensional toughness measure
(τ1,...,τk), which I avoid for the sake of simplicity.17) Further, as the examples show,
in a given problem there may be diﬀerent (ordinally equivalent18)w a y so fd e ﬁning
toughness. Hence the choice of the toughness measure may involve some amount of
arbitrariness.
If the set of policies σ is ﬁnite — a case I will exclude — the toughness levels τσ,
σ ∈ σ, of these policies, are ﬁnitely many numbers, somehow scattered over the axis
of real numbers R; for instance, σ may consist of only three policies, with toughness
levels .1,. 7 and .9. However, the discussion will beneﬁt from considering an entire
interval of toughness levels [τmin,τmax] (with τmin <τ max). Here, toughness τ = τmin
stands for the minimally feasible toughness level along the relevant dimension: "im-
mediate release after capture" when choosing the length of detention, "no captures"
when choosing the capture policy, "no airport controls" when choosing the amount of
airport controls, "no soldiers" when choosing the number of soldiers to be stationed in
17The components of the toughness vector (τ1,...,τk) represent the toughness levels along the
diﬀerent toughness dimensions: Instead of analysing functions R(τ) and T(τ),o n ew o u l dh a v et o
analyse functions R(τ1,...,τk) and T(τ1,...,τk).
18For instance, one would expect that the number of airport controllers is higher (for one policy
than for another), if and only if the number of security checks per passenger is higher, if and only if
the overall time the security check takes per passenger is higher, and so on..Formally, two toughness
measures τσ and ˜ τσ (σ ∈ σ) are ordinally equivalent if for any pair of policies σ,σ
0 ∈ σ, τσ >τ σ0 if
and only if ˜ τσ > ˜ τ; i.e. σ is tougher than σ
0 according to one of the measures if and only if it is so
according to the other measure.Franz Dietrich, February 2004 12
a country, etc. And toughness τ = τmax stands for the maximally feasible toughness
level along the relevant dimension given limited resources: "never released" when
choosing length of detention, "maximal aﬀordable size of troops" when choosing the
size of the troops occupying a country, etc. Besides the extreme toughness levels
τ = τmin and τ = τmax, the interval [τmin,τmax] contains a continuum of intermedi-
ate toughness level τmin <τ<τ max. Note the idealisation here: In practice, a choice
from the (inﬁnite) set of toughness levels [τmin,τmax] is not only unfeasible since the
choice is limited to relatively few policies σ resp. toughness levels τ, but perhaps also
unreasonable since toughness levels near the extremes τmin or τmax are unlikely to be
eﬃcient.
When is a unidimensional toughness measure justiﬁed? While an exact cardinal
measure of toughness may be ambiguous — can one say that "policy σ has toughness
level 1.5"? — toughness in the sense of an ordinal measure seems less problematic since
often one can say that "policy σ is tougher than policy σ0". So it is important that we
interpret the chosen toughness measure merely as an ordinal toughness measure, i.e.
as one of many possible numerical representations of an underlying toughness ordering
of the policies. But even ordinal toughness comparisons may become problematic if
policy σ is tougher than policy σ0 along some dimension but milder along another
dimension. For instance, policy σ might consists in a tougher capture policy but
a milder punishment policy. This points towards the fact that toughness level is
often a multi-dimensional parameter. Assume, for instance, that the choice is of the
entire symptom-related policy. Then toughness is at least two-dimensional: toughness
of punishment policy and toughness of capture policy, if not higher-dimensional by
further subdividing punishment policy and capture policy. Indeed, punishment policy
might be subdivided into length of detention and conditions of detention, the latter
being further subdividable into size of cells, temperature of cells, etc. And, as one
of many possible subdivisions, toughness of capture policy may be taken to consist
of toughness experienced by the terrorists ("toughness to terrorists") and toughness
experienced by the non-terrorists ("toughness to the external world"); a war seems
tough both to terrorists and the external world, while isolated "surgical" military
interventions might be tough mainly to the terrorists and less so to the external
world. So, for the above unidimensional toughness τ to be justiﬁed, I have to assume
that the policy choice problem is narrow enough so that the toughness of the policies
σ ∈ σ considered actually varies along only one toughness dimension.19 It is then
always clear which of two policies is tougher, and so the diﬀerent policies σ ∈ σ can
be unambiguously ordered in terms of toughness: They may be thought of as ordered
19I also allow the "quasi-unidimensional" case in which toughness varies along diﬀerent dimensions
but does so never in opposite directions, so that if a policy is tougher than another along some
dimension, it may not be milder along another dimension. The reason for allowing such cases is that
one may treat them as unidimensional by collecting all toughness dimensions involved (e.g. length
of detention, size of cells, temperature of cells, etc.) into a single broader toughness dimension (e.g.
"toughness of punishment policy"). For instance, the choice between "war" and "no war" (against
a given country) aﬀects both toughness to terrorists and toughness to the external world, but it does
so in the same direction in both cases since a war is the tougher option both to terrorists and to the
external world. By contrast, toughness varies in opposite directions along diﬀerent dimensions when
choosing how to split a ﬁxed budget into one amount spent on more airport controls and one amount
spent on more troops in a foreign country: More toughness (money) along one dimension implies less
toughness (money) along the other dimension.Franz Dietrich, February 2004 13
on a line ranging from "least tough" to "toughest".20 My toughness measure is then
just one (of many possible) numerical representations of this toughness ordering.
2.2 The parameters F,T,R as functions of toughness
The aim of the following analysis is to examine detention rate R, number of terrorists
T, and number of free terrorists F as functions of toughness τ.So, for any toughness
τ ∈ [τmin,τmax] let F(τ),T (τ) and R(τ) denote the value taken by, respectively, F,
T and R when (the policy of) toughness τ is implemented. The policy optimisation
problem (1) may now be expressed in terms of toughness: Toughness τ∗ ∈ [τmin,τmax]
is optimal if it minimises F(τ), i.e. if
F(τ∗)= m i n
τ∈[τmin,τmax]
F(τ), resp. (1 − R(τ∗))T(τ∗)= m i n
τ∈[τmin,τmax]
{(1 − R(τ))T(τ)}.
When analysing the typical shapes of the functions R(τ),T(τ),F(τ),i ti si m p o r -
tant to keep in mind that the exact shapes strongly vary from case to case, as they
depend on the following factors:
(i) the type of policy choice problem considered (length of detention of prisoners,
size of the army occupying a foreign country, etc.);
(ii) the speciﬁc group to which the policy is applied (the population of the Middle
East, the domestic population, a minority living in the domestic country, etc.), and
all exogenous factors determining the behaviour of this group (level of education,
cultural heritage, economic situation, sociological factors, climate, etc.);
(iii) the interpretation of the parameters F,T,R: ﬁxed time horizon or long term
equilibrium interpretation (see the introduction);
(iv) the speciﬁc way toughness is measured, i.e. the way τ is deﬁned.21
For the sake of generality, I do not restrict the discussion to particular answers
in each of (i)-(iv); consequently, the following analysis of the shapes of the functions
F(τ),T(τ),R(τ) is qualitative, i.e. concerned with signs of (ﬁrst and second) deriv-
atives, minima, etc. I shall identify general features of these functions valid in most
cases, and point out potential exceptions.
Smooth functions. Strictly speaking, the functions F(τ),T(τ),R(τ) would have
to be "step functions" rather than being continuous.22 But they are more easily
imagined as continuous functions, and so the discussion and all ﬁgures will assume
continuity — a matter of "smoothing out" the steps, which is no distortion in a large
enough group. When I refer to derivatives, I moreover assume diﬀerentiability.
20Formally, the "tougher than" relation is a linear order, i.e. a complete, transitive and irreﬂexive
order.
21Recall that there are many ordinally equivalent toughness measures (which are strictly increasing
transformations of each other). If τ is replaced by, for instance ¯ τ := τ
3, then R may be a quite
diﬀerent function of ¯ τ than of τ. More precisely, the signs of the ﬁrst derivatives of R(τ),T (τ) and
F(τ) are invariant under transforming the toughness measure (by the chain rule for diﬀerentiation
the composition of two functions), but the second derivative is not invariant. So, the claims about
ﬁrst derivatives (viz. that, typically, R(τ) is increasing and T(τ) is U-shaped) do not depend on the
chosen toughness measure, whereas statements about second derivatives (viz. the typical concavity
of R(τ) and convexity of T(τ)) do not enjoy independence of the chosen toughness measure.
22The functions F(τ) and R(τ) represent numbers of persons and hence "jump" between integer
numbers, and detention rate R(τ) represents a fraction of the number of terrorists and hence "jumps"
between fractional numbers.Franz Dietrich, February 2004 14
2.3 Eﬀect of toughness on detention rate: function R(τ)
I begin with the easiest function, namely detention rate R(τ).As illustrated by Figure
τ
R(τ)





1 – R (τ)
τmax τmax τmin τmin
1
0
Figure 2: Example of detention rate R(τ) as a function of toughness τ and corre-
sponding function 1 − R(τ)
2, this function is typically (strictly) increasing and (strictly) concave23; in other
words, R(τ) has a positive ﬁrst and a negative second derivative; in even other words,
toughness τ has positive and decreasing returns on R. Indeed, more toughness τ
plausibly allows to detain a larger proportion of terrorists (higher R(τ)), but a given
marginal increase of toughness ∆τ should have less eﬀect on R(τ) if τ resp. R(τ) is
already high since raising R is the harder, the higher R already is. Let me illustrate
this by taking up some of the earlier examples. First, the claim that R(τ) is an
increasing function is conﬁrmed by the following examples: If toughness τ is average
number of years for which captured terrorists are detained, then higher τ entails higher
detention rate R(τ); if toughness τ is number of security checks at the airport, or
size of an army in an occupied country, then higher τ entails more "capture success",
hence a higher detention rate R(τ). In these examples the claim that R(τ) is concave
(has a negative second derivative) seems also reasonable. But again, neither increase
nor concavity of R(τ) are fully obvious in these (and other) examples, and for this
reason one might prefer the decomposition of Section 1.6 in which it seems more clear
that the neutralisation parameter afc is increasing and concave as a function of the
toughness of capture policy.
In Figure 2, the function R(τ) has two other features beside of being increasing
and concave: it starts at 0 for minimal toughness τ = τmin, but does not reach 1
even at maximal toughness τ = τmax; in other words, no terrorist is detained at
minimal toughness, but not every terrorist is detained at maximal toughness. The
latter feature (R(τmax) < 1) is generally true: Whatever the policy choice problem,
even maximal toughness cannot create a situation where not a single terrorist is free.
The former feature (R(τmin)=0 ), however, is not general and may or may not hold
depending on the type of policy choice problem considered. First, two examples
where R(τmin)=0does indeed hold: If toughness τ is length of detention then
minimal toughness τmin means detention length of zero, so that there are no detained
terrorists; and if the choice problem is the (very broad) one of choosing the capture
policy, then minimal toughness τmin means "no eﬀorts to capture", so that again
23A function g(τ)( τ ∈ [τmin,τmax]) is concave (convex)i f ,f o ra l lτ,τ
0 ∈ [τmin,τmax] and all
λ ∈ (0,1),g (λτ +( 1− λ)τ
0) ≥ (≤)λg(τ)+( 1− λ)g(τ). The deﬁnition of strictly concave (convex) is
obtained by replacing the weak inequality ≥ (≤) by the strict inequality > (<).Franz Dietrich, February 2004 15
there are no detained terrorists. But these two examples may in fact be the only
ones in which R(τmin)=0 . Indeed, I have R(τmin) > 0 when the choice relates to a
condition (rather than the length) of detention (as discussed below), or to only a part
of capture policy (since minimal toughness for this part does not prevent captures
coming from other parts of capture policy24).
Exceptions. There is an important class of policy choice problems for which the
function R(τ) is typically ﬂat, i.e. where toughness has no eﬀect on detention rate.
This class consists of all choices of conditions of detention, i.e. of all subdimensions of
punishment policy other than length of detention. Indeed, the proportion of detained
terrorists R(τ) does not increase by adding toughness of any kind to "life in prison"
(more hours of work, smaller cells, etc.) without increasing the length of detention.
2.4 Deterrence eﬀect and hate eﬀect of toughness on number of
terrorists: function T(τ)
I now turn to the typical shape of the function T(τ), i.e. to the causal eﬀect of
toughness τ on number of terrorists T. I shall argue that this eﬀect is the result
of deterrence and the so-called hate eﬀect, the combination of which typically leads
to a U-shaped function T(τ) as in Figure 3 — again with important exceptions in
the ﬁeld of punishment policy choice. I call a function (of τ ∈ [τmin,τmax])" U -
shaped" if it is ﬁrst strictly decreasing and then increasing, i.e. strictly decreasing
on [τmin,τ0] and strictly increasing on [τ0,τmax] for some intermediate toughness
τ0 ∈ (τmin,τmax). The function T(τ) might in addition be convex23 (as in Figure
3 and as a "U" suggests), in which case I talk of "convex U-shapedness". I call
"deterrence" the reduction of T due to fear of capture and punishment. "Hate eﬀect"
is used (by a stretch of language) as a collective term to denote the increase of T due
to all sorts of (terrorism-proneness-increasing) feelings or attitudes brought about by
(the toughness of) the policy: hate against those ﬁghting terrorism, pride, solidarity
with other terrorists, general "brutalisation" of society, etc.25
Optimal toughness. Before proceeding to the justiﬁcation of the U-shapedness
of T(τ), it is important to recall that I aim to minimise not number terrorists T(τ)
but number of free terrorists F(τ), the lower curve in Figure 3. The function F(τ)
arises by multiplying T(τ) with the function 1 − R(τ), the dashed curve in Figure
2. By the last subsection, R(τ) is a concave increasing function, and so 1 − R(τ) is
ac o n v e xd e c r e a s i n go n e .I fi ti st r u et h a tT(τ) is U-shaped, multiplying T(τ) with
the convex decreasing function 1 − R(τ) "shifts" the "U" towards the bottom-right,
a ss h o w ni nF i g u r e3 . I fT(τ) grows suﬃciently strongly for high toughness τ (i.e.
if the upturn of the "U" is suﬃciently pronounced), multiplication with 1 − R(τ)
preserves U-shapedness, i.e. the resulting function F(τ)=( 1−R(τ))T(τ) is a second
U-shaped function rather than being a "curved L"-shaped; F(τ) diﬀers from T(τ)
in that it ﬁrst falls at a higher rate than T(τ) and then increases at a smaller rate
than T(τ)26. The optimal toughness τoptimal, which minimises F(τ),i ss t r i c t l yh i g h e r
24For example, the minimally tough policy of "no airport controls" excludes that terrorists are
captured when they enter a plane, but terrorists may still be captured at other occasions given some
toughness along other dimensions (secret service, hidden cameras, police force, etc.).
25It is irrelevant here whether it can in any sense be legitimate or rational to develop such feelings
in response to the policy; what matters is whether and to what extent these feelings are developed.
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Figure 3: Example of function T(τ) and resulting function F(τ)=( 1− R(τ))T(τ);
minima of T(τ) and F(τ) indicated by thick lines
than the toughness τ0, which minimises T(τ). In other words, the policy should be
tougher than what minimises the number of terrorists T(τ). T h ea m o u n tb yw h i c h
the policy should be tougher, i.e. by which τoptimal (the minimum of F(τ)) exceeds
τ0 (the minimum of T(τ)), depends on the rate at which T(τ) grows (and 1 − R(τ)
falls) to the right of τ0: The optimal toughness τoptimal is only little higher than τ0
if the upturn of T(τ) to the right of τ0 is suﬃciently pronounced, and may be much
higher than τ0 if the upturn or T(τ) is little pronounced.
I now explain, ﬁrst informally and then more formally, why T(τ) is typically U-
shaped. As when justifying concave increase of R(τ), the argument will be plausible
but not fully transparent; again, more transparency might be achieved by considering
ad i ﬀerent decomposition of F, for instance that of Section 1.6 in which U-shaped
toughness eﬀects on the inclination parameters anf and afn may be easier to justify.
Informal justiﬁcation of U-shapedness of T(τ).
- The policy of minimal toughness τ = τmin (that is, depending on the speciﬁc
choice problem, detention of captured terrorists for a zero length of time, or absence
of military presence, or absence of airport controls, etc.) entails a high number of
terrorists T(τ)=T(τmin) because of the absence of deterrence.
- A small increase of toughness τ beyond τmin should reduce the number of ter-
rorists T(τ), because the starting deterrence should overcompensate the starting hate
eﬀect; in other words, T(τ) is a decreasing function in some right neighbourhood of
τ = τmin. Indeed, a small amount of toughness (detention for a short length of time, or
small military presence, or few airport controls, etc.), seems likely to create less hate
than deterrence, by being perceived mainly as a legitimate amount of self-protection.
- Arguably, at least for the case of capture (rather than punishment) policy choice,
if toughness τ exceeds some critical level (where this level is strongly case-speciﬁc),
29)o fF(τ) is smaller than that of T(τ). The reason is that the growth rate of F(τ) equals that of
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additional toughness creates more additional hate eﬀect than deterrence, thus letting
T(τ) increase overall. Why this "taking over" of the hate eﬀect? For instance,
when choosing (some part of) capture policy, if toughness is already so high that a
terrorist is more likely to be captured than to stay free, a further raise of toughness
should provide little additional deterrence, while still providing additional hate. Here,
deterrence has little growth potential once toughness is already high; by contrast,
raising toughness from "moderate" to "high", or from "high" to "very high" may
well signiﬁcantly increase the hate eﬀect, by being perceived by the relevant group as
illegitimate.









τmax τmax τmin τmin
0
Figure 4: Examples of deterrence Tdeter(τ) and hate eﬀect Thate(τ)
The informal argument discussed above can be put more formally. If deterrence
and hate have linear eﬀects on T, then I may write T(τ)=T0 − Tdeter(τ)+Thate(τ),
where Tdeter(τ) and Thate(τ) are the deterrence eﬀect resp. hate eﬀect of toughness τ
on T, and T0 the value of T(τ) at toughness τ = τmin at which Tdeter(τ) and Thate(τ)
are both zero. (In the quite possible case of non-linearity, a preceding transformation
of T often leads to a linear model.27) As illustrated by Figure 4, the idea is that,
typically,
(i) both deterrence Tdeter(τ) and hate eﬀect Thate(τ) are strictly increasing func-
tions,
(ii) deterrence Tdeter(τ) is a strictly concave function (diminishing marginal hate
eﬀect),
(iii) hate eﬀect Thate(τ) is a strictly convex function (increasing marginal hate
eﬀect).
Before commenting on these claims, let us note what they entail. Supposing that
ﬁrst and second derivatives exist, (i) means that T0
deter(τ),T0
hate(τ) > 0, (ii) means that
27For instance, T(τ) may be the product (not sum) of a term depending only on deterrence and
a term depending only on hate. This can be reduced to a linear (i.e. additive) relation by taking
logarithms on both sides. In general, the (after transformation linear) model has the form ˜ T(τ)=
T0−Tdeter(τ)+Thate(τ) where ˜ T(τ) is the transformation of T(τ) creating the linearity (e.g. ˜ T =l o gT,
or ˜ T =l o g
T
1−T , or any other increasing function of T). One could similarly argue that ˜ T(τ) is U-
shaped (i.e. ﬁrst decreasing, then increasing), which implies that T(τ) i sU - s h a p e dt o oa n dh a st h e
same minimising value as ˜ T(τ).Franz Dietrich, February 2004 18
T00
deter(τ) < 0, and (iii) means that T00
hate(τ) > 0. Further, (ii)&(iii) imply that T(τ) is
strictly convex, since T00(τ)=−T00
deter(τ)+T00
hate(τ) > 0, and so we are already close
to U-shapedness. If there exists a toughness τ0 ∈ (τmin,τmax) at which deterrence
and hate eﬀect have identical marginal returns (T0
deter(τ0)=T0
hate(τ0)), then this
toughness τ0 represents the unique minimum of T(τ), by T0(τ0)=−T0
deter(τ0)+
T0
hate(τ0)=0and the strict convexity of T(τ). So, T(τ) would indeed be U-shaped,
in fact even convex U-shaped.
Claim (i) is non-controversial: more toughness entails more deterrence and hate
eﬀects.
Claim (ii) seems plausible in many cases. Indeed, the rise of the deterrence eﬀect
Tdeter(τ) in response to a marginal increase of toughness ∆τ should be the lower, the
higher τ already is: Tdeter(τ) increases a lot if τ rises from 0 to 0.1, less if τ rises from
0.1 to 0.2, even less if τ rises from 0.2 to 0.3, etc. In the case of capture policy choice,
once τ is so high that terrorists are more likely to be captured than to stay free, an
additional rise of τ might leave deterrence Tdeter(τ) nearly unchanged.
Claim (iii) is less obvious, and I do not wish to defend it for all situations. Whether
(iii) holds depends on the psychological and sociological "dynamics of hate" (and
similar feelings) in response to an increase in toughness. Only a case-by-case analysis
can decide when (iii) holds, which is beyond the scope of this paper. A defence of (iii)
would have to take the form of arguing that, the tougher the policy (already) is, the
more the ground is prepared for an additional bit of toughness ∆τ to create additional
hate; for instance, an additional policeman (∆τ) is the greater a provocation, the
more policemen are already around, so the argument. Metaphorically, the additional
policeman is the straw that breaks the camel’s back only if there are already many
policemen around. If this is the right metaphor, then additional toughness ∆τ has
more marginal hate eﬀect if toughness τ is already close to what is perceived as
provocative (resp. if the weight on the camel is already close to what the camel can
maximally carry).28
But note that, even if (iii) fails to hold and Thate(τ) is not strictly convex, T(τ)
m a ys t i l lb es t r i c t l yc o n v e xs i n c eT00(τ) > 0 holds as soon as T00
hate(τ) exceeds the
(negative!) quantity T00
deter(τ) for all τ. And even if the latter condition still fails and
hence T(τ) is not strictly convex, T(τ) may still be U-shaped, i.e. ﬁrst falling and
then rising.
Exceptions. In some cases the function T(τ) is not convex U-shaped (see footnote
28), or not even U-shaped. Let me mention policy choice problems in which it is
doubtful, respectively, (a) whether T(τ) has a decreasing part, or (b) whether T(τ)
has an increasing part.
28Taking the metaphor seriously, if toughness τ is even higher, i.e. if the number of policemen is
already perceived as provocative (resp. if the camel’s back is already broken), then the additional
police man ∆τ may now bring little additional hate eﬀect (it is impossible to do more than breaking
the camel’s back!). This would suggest that, when toughness τ grows from minimally tough τmin
to maximally tough τmax, t h eh a t ee ﬀect grows ﬁrst slowly, then sharply (when moving from non-
provocative to provocative), then again slowly; formally, hate eﬀect Thate(τ) would not be a convex
function (as assumed in (iii)), but a ﬁrst-convex-then-concave function. Under this scenario, T(τ)=
T0 −Tdeter(τ)+Thate(τ) would not be convex U-shaped, but of the shape of a "U" that stabilises (or
even drops) at the top end of the toughness interval [τmin,τmax]. Provided that this stabilisation (or
even drop) is not too pronounced, the optimal toughness or minimum of F(τ)=( 1−R(τ))T(τ) will
still lay below the sharp rise of the hate eﬀect Thate(τ).Franz Dietrich, February 2004 19
(a) Assume the group consists of persons who cannot be deterred at all, as it
might seem to be the case for potential suicide bombers. (Note, however, that this is
an extreme assumption since not only the actual terrorists, but also all non-terrorists
would have to be entirely fearless.) Then toughness creates no deterrence (Tdeter(τ)=
0), and the remaining hate eﬀect turns T(τ) (= T0 + Thate(τ))i n t oa neverywhere
increasing function. More realistically, if deterrence is existent but small, it is doubtful
whether T(τ) has a decreasing part since the marginal deterrence might be smaller
than the marginal hate eﬀect even for small toughness τ.
(b) In many policy choice problems related to punishment policy, it seems unclear
whether T(τ) has an increasing part, i.e. whether marginal hate eﬀect becomes higher
than marginal deterrence for large toughness τ. One has to distinguish between
choosing length and conditions of detention. In the ﬁrst case (with toughness τ
deﬁned, say, as average number of years detained) there is little reason to assume an
increasing marginal hate eﬀect, i.e. to assume a convex hate eﬀect Thate(τ); perhaps
even that Thate(τ) ﬂattens out for large toughness τ: An additional year of detention
might be "a big deal" if added to 5 years of detention (much additional hate eﬀect),
but "no big deal" if added to 25 years of detention (little additional hate eﬀect). Given
s u c hl i m i t e dg r o w t ho fThate(τ), it may be that Thate(τ) never "takes over" compared
to Tdeter(τ), so that T(τ)=T0 − Tdeter(τ)+Thate(τ) stays decreasing even for large
τ. As for choosing conditions of detention (size of cells, number of hours of work per
day per prisoner, etc.), there is here no general reason to assume decreasing marginal
deterrence, i.e. concavity of Tdeter(τ). For instance, when choosing the number of
hours work per day, Tdeter(τ) may be convex rather than concave: One additional hour
is bearable when added to 5 hours work (little additional deterrence), but perhaps
unbearable when coming on top of 10 hours work (much additional deterrence). So,
as when choosing length of detention, the hate eﬀect need not "take over" and hence
T(τ) need not be increasing for large τ, but this time because Tdeter(τ) is not concave
(perhaps convex) rather than because Thate(τ) is not convex (perhaps concave). In
fact, when choosing conditions of detention the shape of T(τ) m a ye v e nb eu n c l e a r
everywhere since even the increasing start of T(τ) is questionable. Indeed, it does
not seem obvious whether an initial raise of toughness of conditions of detention (one
hour of work instead of no work, etc.) creates more deterrence or more hate eﬀect on
T(τ).
2.5 Summary of typical shapes and general policy recommendations
I have argued that T(τ) is typically U-shaped and R(τ) typically concave increasing,
with important exceptions in the ﬁeld of punishment policy choice, i.e. of choosing
length and conditions of detention. The typical shapes are summarised in Table 1,
where "unclear" stands for "no typical shape". Further, "capture policy" stands for
a policy choice regarding either t h ee n t i r ec a p t u r ep o l i c yor of one of its components
(such as number of airport controls); and similarly for "conditions of detention".
Also, recall that length of detention and conditions of detention together make up
punishment policy, and that punishment policy and capture policy together make up
the symptom-related policy.
In Table 1, the entries for the function R(τ) were justiﬁed in Section 2.3 (with
conditions of detention mentioned under "exceptions"), and the entries for the func-Franz Dietrich, February 2004 20
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Table 1: Typical shapes of R(τ) and T(τ) and policy recommendations for diﬀerent
policy choice problems (MH: marginal hate eﬀect; MD: marginal deterrence)
tion T(τ) were justiﬁed in Section 2.4 (with length of detention and conditions of
detention mentioned under "exceptions"). The policy recommendations in the last
column are, of course, no more than rough indications to be reﬁned in case-by-case
analyses. The recommendations follow from the two preceding columns together
with the assumption that the (sole) aim is to minimise number of free terrorists
F(τ)=( 1− R(τ))T(τ). The policy recommendation for capture policy has been
discussed in more detail in Section 2.4 under "optimal toughness". Regarding length
of detention, toughness should be "not very low" because the initial decrease of T(τ)
and the increase of R(τ) imply that F(τ) has an initial decrease, and hence toughness
should be beyond this region of initial decrease. No general policy recommendation
is possible for conditions of detention, given the absence of typical properties of the
function F(τ).
2.6 Two extreme cases: ﬂat T(τ) and V-shaped T(τ)
It is worth highlighting the implications of a U-shaped function T(τ) — the typical case
at least for capture policy choice — by considering two extreme (but often unrealistic)
scenarios. These scenarios might be informally described as the case where the "U"
is (close to) a ﬂat line and the case where the "U" is (close to) a "V". More precisely,
in the ﬁrst case the growth rate of T(τ) stays near zero, and in the second case the
growth rate of T(τ) rises sharply from "very negative" to "very positive".29
The function T(τ) is ﬂat (Figure 5) if people react only very little to the toughness
level, so that the number of terrorists is roughly the same whatever the toughness.
Then, minimising F(τ)=( 1− R(τ))T(τ) is nearly equivalent with minimising the
ﬁrst factor 1 − R(τ), i.e. with maximising detention rate R(τ). So, since R(τ) is
a decreasing function, the policy should be maximally tough (in my model which
neglects all costs of toughness).
By contrast, in the case of a V-shaped function T(τ) (Figure 6), in which the
number of terrorists is highly sensitive to the toughness level, minimising F(τ)=
(1 − R(τ))T(τ) is nearly equivalent with minimising the second factor T(τ).30 So,




0(τ)/g(τ). This measures the "relative growth", while the derivative g
0(τ) measures the "absolute
growth".
30Let me be more precise without over-formalising. The claim that F(τ) and T(τ) reach their
minima for roughly the same toughness τ means that the derivatives F
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Figure 5: Example of ﬂat function T(τ) and resulting function F(τ)=( 1 −R(τ))T(τ);
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Figure 6: Example of V-shaped function T(τ) and corresponding function F(τ)=
(1 − R(τ))T(τ); minima indicated by thick lines
the policy should aim to minimise the number of terrorists regardless of the capture
success, i.e. to implement the particular toughness level at which the combination of
deterrence and hate eﬀect entails the minimal inclination towards terrorism within
the group (marginal hate eﬀect equal to marginal deterrence).
It might seem that the policy of the "international anti-terrorism coalition" in
response to September 11, 2001, is mainly concerned with increasing the detention
rate R, thereby implicitly assuming the case of a ﬂat function T(τ).








dτ logT(τ)). But the V-shapedness of T(τ) means by deﬁnition that its growth rate
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rises sharply from "very negative" to "very positive" (in fact, I only need
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dτ logT(τ) are zero for roughly the same toughness
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3 A methodological assessment of the approach
I have illustrated how the general method (a)-(d) — decomposing an objective func-
tion into inclination and neutralisation parameters and estimating policy eﬀects on
each of these parameters — may work in the case of decomposing the number of free
terrorists F into (1 − R)T. The estimation step has been theory-based rather than
statistical, and may be reﬁned in a case-by-case analysis. While the last section dealt
exclusively with the symptom-related policy and its toughness level, I now go back
to the general discussion, while sticking to the same decomposition as an illustra-
tion. Since I consider an arbitrary, more or less narrow (anti-terrorism) policy choice
problem, the term "policy" refers to either the full anti-terrorism policy, or some
relevant component of it, such as (part of) the cause-related policy, or (part of) the
symptom-related policy resp. the toughness level. A policy in this ﬂexible sense is
denoted by π, and the set of policies considered by π. Examples include the choice
of the amount of development aid for a given country (cause-related), the decision
whether to attack a given country, and the choice of length or conditions of detention
(symptom-related). The reader who prefers to focus on a particular type of policy
choice may replace in his/her mind π either by (χ,σ) (choosing the full anti-terrorism
policy) or by χ (choosing (some part of) the cause-related policy) or by σ resp. τ
(choosing (some part of) the symptom-related policy resp. its toughness level).
But is the "indirect" method (a)-(d) adequate, or would it have been better to
focus directly on F and forget about the decomposition into (1 − R)T?T o a n s w e r
this question, in this section the so-called direct statistical estimation (of policy ef-
fects) is compared with the theory-based estimation (ﬁrst steps of which were made in
this paper). While the former is purely statistical, the latter is based on theoretical
arguments, which are ideally empirically/statistically tested. It is argued, perhaps
not as a ﬁnal word, that a direct statistical estimation — if possible at all — does not
beneﬁt from the decomposition into (1 − R)T (but perhaps from other decomposi-
tions), whereas a theory-based estimation — often the only possibility — should indeed
decompose F (for instance into (1−R)T), to cut a complex estimation problem into
more manageable pieces. After clarifying the diﬀerence between direct statistical and
theory-based estimation in Section 3.1, I discuss the purely statistical estimation in
Sections 3.2 and 3.3, and the theory-based estimation in Sections 3.4 and 3.5.
3.1 Clarifying the terminology
After some general words about "theoretic" versus "statistical" arguments, I will
make the distinction between "direct statistical" and "theory-based" estimation. The
former is purely statistical, the latter based on (ideally, statistically tested) arguments.
"Theoretic" versus "statistical". In politics and economics it is common to distin-
guish between theoretical and statistical arguments or analyses. As a simple example,
consider the demand function and the supply function for a given good in some mar-
ket economy. Straightforward reasoning about the aims of demanders and suppliers
tells (at least) that demand is a decreasing and supply an increasing function of price
— a simple example of theoretical arguments. A statistical analysis of past price and
demand/supply data may allow a more precise estimation of both curves (after over-
coming high obstacles since prices are endogenous). More generally, when trying toFranz Dietrich, February 2004 23
learn how diﬀerent variables of interest aﬀect each other (how prices aﬀect demand
and supply, how interest rates aﬀect inﬂation, how climate aﬀects birth rate, and in
our case how policies π aﬀect the values of F,T,R), a theoretical analysis proceeds
by understanding the relevant causal mechanisms governing the interaction between
variables, using psychological, sociological, political, economical, or indeed any type
of theoretical arguments. As in this paper, this results typically (but not always31)i n
qualitative conclusions: increasing or decreasing eﬀect (ﬁrst derivative), increasing or
decreasing marginal eﬀect (second derivative), existence of minima or maxima, etc.
By contrast, a statistical analysis is based on past data and may, in principle, be
"blind" in the sense of not caring of why and by what means the estimated eﬀects
occur. Of course, theoretical and statistical arguments may be combined.32
"Theory-based" and "direct statistical" estimation. The eﬀect of policies π on
values of F,T,R, as given by the functions F(π),T(π),R(π) (π ∈ π), are somewhat
more diﬃcult eﬀect to estimate (theoretically or statistically!) than, say, the eﬀect of
prices on demand or supply. What I want to compare are not theoretical and statis-
tical arguments per se, but the "direct statistical" and the "theory-based" estimation
of the functions F(π),T(π), and R(π). With a "direct statistical" estimation of F(π)
(resp. T(π),R(π)) I mean a statistical estimation based on data of how policies π af-
fected F (resp. T,R) in the past. A "theory-based" estimation of (mainly qualitative
features of) the function F(π) (resp. T(π),R(π)) need not be "purely" theoretical: It
is based on arguments that have ideally been veriﬁed empirically/statistically and in
this sense may be a combined theoretical and statistical approach; the diﬀerence to
the direct statistical estimation is that the statistical data used (if any) are not data
directly about policy eﬀects on F (resp. T,R) but other data that conﬁrm certain
hypotheses used in an (otherwise theoretical) estimation of policy eﬀects on F (resp.
T,R). For instance, when estimating how the policy π of an improved school system
aﬀects the number of terrorists T, a direct statistical estimation would use past data
of how T responded to improved education, while a theory-based estimation might
use statistically conﬁrmed arguments about psychological, sociological, or other ef-
fects of higher levels of education, such as eﬀects on the "youth culture", on group
dynamics, on the aims and wishes of young people, on the crime rate among young
people, and so on.
3.2 Direct statistical estimation: diﬃcult for each of F, T, R
Let me brieﬂy summarise the rather serious obstacles faced by a direct statistical
estimation of the functions F(π),T(π),R(π), i.e. of the causal eﬀects of policies
on values of F,T,R. I argue that three standard econometric problems are at their
strongest: the lack of data, the diﬃculty to measure data, and a lack of ceteris paribus.
(A partial escape-route as far as F is concerned is discussed in the next subsection.)
Unprecedented policy choice. I ft h ep o l i c yc h o i c ep r o b l e mf a c e di sn e wa n dm a n y
or all of the policies π ∈ π (or approximations of them) have never been in action
31A counterexample is game theory, which derives the exact behaviour of (rational) agents from
theoretical arguments about rationality.
32I nf a c t ,a na n a l y s i si sr a r e l ypurely statistical, since the way data are used often requires at least
some theoretical knowledge about, for instance, which regressors to include into a regression equation
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in the past, then the direct statistical estimation fails simply because of the absence
of past data. This might seem to be the case for the capture policy choice faced by
the international anti-terrorism coalition after September 11, 2001. But other capture
policy choices on smaller scales need not be unprecedented, nor are many punishment
policy choices and many cause-related policy choices such as the kind and extent of
development policy.
Diﬃculty to measure F,T,R. Assume that a given policy π (or a close approx-
i m a t i o no fi t )h a sb e e nr u ni nt h ep a s t( f o ras u ﬃciently long period of time and
relative to some group preferably similar to the one presently relevant). Can the
resulting values of F,T,R be measured? What is easily measured is the number of
detained terrorists D, but it is unclear how the rest of the group is divided up into
a number of non-terrorists N and free terrorists F since free terrorists will try not
to appear as such. F can at most be estimated, for instance through secret service
information. Knowing D but not F and N, one knows neither of the parameters of
interest: number of free terrorists F, number of terrorists T = F + D, and detention
rate R = D/T = D/(F + D) — a serious problem for "data collection".
Lack of ceteris paribus. By ignoring the two problems just mentioned, assume
that a given policy π ∈ π was in action in the past, say exactly one time, and that
the resulting values of F,T,R were measured; let F0,T0,R 0 be the values measured.
Let us see why these values may be of little indication for the present choice situation.
Following common practice in statistics, the estimate of a parameter is written with
a "hat". Having exactly one past observation (sample size of one), it is natural to
estimate the true values F(π),T(π),R(π) by the following group-size-adjusted version
of the past-observed values:
ˆ F(π): =
m
m0F0, ˆ T(π): =
m
m0T0, ˆ R(π): =R0, (4)
where m and m0 denote the size of the present and the past-observed group, re-
spectively. For instance, if the present group is twice as large as the past-observed
group (m/m0 =2 ) , then F(π) is estimated by ˆ F(π)=2 F0, i.e. by twice the
number of free terrorists measured in the past group. Note that I need no group-
size-adjustment to estimate detention rate R(π) since R(π) is a ratio of absolute
numbers. Can ˆ F(π), ˆ T(π), ˆ R(π) be expected to be good approximations of the true
F(π),T(π),R(π)? Usually no, because F,T,R are inﬂuenced by factors other than
the policy π, and these other factors will usually vary between the past and the
present group (no ceteris paribus): diﬀerent level of poverty, level of education, age
structure, group cohesion, climate, etc. Basic econometrics tells us that estimates
such as (4) can be relied upon only if factors other than the policy either have a neg-
ligible impact on F,T,R or happen to be approximately the same for the past and
the present case (ceteris paribus). Unfortunately, none of these conditions is usually
met.33 For instance, the eﬀects of a given policy π applied to the Afghan population,
while perhaps reliably estimated by the eﬀects of the same policy applied to the same
population two years earlier (approximate ceteris paribus), cannot be estimated by
33A drastic example might illustrate this: The fact that the (population-size-adjusted) values of T
and F for the French population are easily ten, hundred or more times lower than for the Palestinian
population is caused not only by diﬀerent anti-terrorism policies, but also to factors such as more
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the eﬀects of the same policy applied to some other population living in diﬀerent
circumstances (no ceteris paribus). So, estimates such as (4) have to be treated with
great caution, except in the rare cases of (approximate) ceteris paribus.
If the eﬀect of policy π has been measured k times rather than a single time,
there is a hope of obtaining more reliable estimates of F(π),T(π),R(π), provided
that the diﬀerent violations of ceteris paribus across the sample roughly cancel out
against each other, that is, behave in average like in the present situation rather than
deviating systematically from it.34 However, this "cancelling out" is not only unlikely,
but also hard to deﬁne and verify, so that we are far from exact statistics.
Of course, more sophisticated estimation techniques than that of (4) resp. foot-
note 34 may be available, such as a (linear or non-linear) regression analysis.35 All
techniques will in one way or another face the problem of lack of ceteris paribus; but
some techniques may be more immune than others by tackling the problem explicitly
(e.g. the inclusion of control variables in a regression, or a 2-stage regression).
3.3 Direct statistical estimation: easier for F than for T and R
Let us now see why, luckily, a policy choice is possible without knowledge of the
policy eﬀects on absolute levels of F,T,R — knowledge of certain relative changes is
suﬃcient; and, so my argument will continue, direct statistical estimation of relative
changes is easier for F than for T and R, because the measurement problem may be
overcome for F. This suggests that a direct statistical estimation — if possible at all —
should focus straight on F and ignore the explanation in terms of T and R.( Il e a v e
open whether this argument can be extended to other decompositions of F.)
To simplify, let us assume that the choice is between only two policies, one of which
might be the status quo and the other an alternative. The two policies are denoted 1
and 2, with corresponding values of F,T,R denoted F1,T 1,R 1 resp. F2,T 2,R 2. The
question of which policy is better can be expressed either directly in terms of F or
i n d i r e c t l yi nt e r m sT and R:
in terms of F in terms of T,R
policy 2 is better than (is
worse than, ties) policy1 if...
F2
F1 > (<,=)1 T2
T1 > (<,=)1−R1
1−R2.
Table 2: Decision criterion based on F and based on T, R
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k are the group sizes in the past observations, respectively.
35The estimates ˆ F(π), ˆ T(π), ˆ R(π) of F(π),T(π),R(π) for a given policy π need not be based solely
on those values of F,T,R observed for that policy π, but may be based more generally on all values of
F,T,R observed for policies π
0 in π (or even outside π). This is the case in a regression analysis. A
(linear or non-linear) regression of F,T and R may become possible if each policy π can be identiﬁed
with a real number (e.g. a toughness τ or an amount of money spent for development aid) or with
a vector of real numbers (e.g. a multi-dimensional toughness parameter (τ1,...,τk) or a vector of
amounts spent for diﬀerent issues).Franz Dietrich, February 2004 26
(The second criterion follows from Fi =( 1− Ti)Ri.) Whichever criterion is used,
knowledge of absolute magnitudes of F resp. T,R is not required; rather, knowledge
of the relative change of F resp. of T and 1 − R is suﬃcient:
(a) Using the criterion based on F, an estimate of the ratio F2/F1, and more
precisely of how F2/F1 compares to 1, suﬃces; no idea of the absolute magnitudes F1
and F2 is required.
(b) Using the criterion based on T,R, estimates of the ratios T2/T1 and (1 −
R1)/(1−R2), and more precisely of how they compare to each other, suﬃce; no idea
of the absolute magnitudes T1,T 2,R 1,R 2 is required.
Which ratios are easier to estimate: that in (a) based on T or those in (b) based
on T,R? Given that the estimation is direct statistical,i ti st h a ti n( a ) ,a si ss e e nn o w
(whereas in a theory-based estimation it is those in (b), as seen later). Let me explain.
In (a) one has to estimate the ratio F12 := F2/F1, and in (b) the ratios T12 := T2/T1
and R12 := (1−R1)/(1−R2). Estimating ratios rather than absolute magnitudes does
usually not help avoiding the ﬁrst and third of the problems mentioned in Section 3.2
(unprecedented policy choice and lack of ceteris paribus). However, the measurement
problem may be overcome for F12, but not so for T12 and R12. The "trick" is that,
while number of free terrorists cannot be measured, this number can, plausibly, be
assumed as roughly proportional to the number of terrorism attacks which can be
measured. For policies 1 and 2 respectively, denote by A1 and A2 the resulting
attack frequency, i.e. the number of attacks per unit of time (month, or quarter, or
year, etc.). Assuming that attack frequency is roughly proportional to number of
free terrorists, F2/F1 ≈ A2/A1.36 For instance, if there are twice as many attacks
per unit of time under policy 2 than under policy 1 (A2/A1 =2 ) then there are
roughly twice as many free terrorists under policy 2 than under policy 1 F2/F1 ≈ 2).
It follows that an estimate of the ratio A12 := A2/A1 can serve as an estimate of
F12 = F2/F1.37 Whether A1 and A2 and hence A12 may indeed be estimated from
past-observed attack frequencies depends on whether the two other obstacles exist or
may be overcome (unprecedented policy choice, and lack of ceteris paribus).38
3.4 Theory-based estimation: how to go beyond my analysis
L e tm en o wt u r nt ot h et h e o r y - b a s e de s t i m a t i o no fp o l i c ye ﬀects on F,T,R,w h i c h
does not use past data of F,T,R but is based on theoretical arguments (which may
still be empirically/statistically conﬁrmed). I start, in this subsection, by giving two
reasons of why a theory-based estimation may be successful and go beyond the ﬁrst
steps made in this paper.
More results by specialising. By focussing on a concrete policy choice problem
rather than taking the general angle of this paper, more reﬁned and concrete estima-
36Insofar as this approximation is inaccurate, the policy will minimise the attack frequency rather
than the number of free terrorists — perhaps no big problem.
37Although such an estimation is based on data of policy eﬀects on attack frequencies, not on F
itself, we may still talk of "direct statistical estimation" (in a wider sense) because data of (relative
changes of) attack frequencies may count as approximate data of (relative changes of) F.
38The simplest estimate of A1 resp. A2 is the average (group-size-adjusted) past-observed attack
frequency under policy 1 resp. 2 (as for the estimates of F(π) and T(π) in footnote 34). But a
regression analysis, perhaps with control variables, may also be possible, perhaps even advisable in
order to compensate for a lack of ceteris paribus.Franz Dietrich, February 2004 27
tion of policy eﬀects on F,T,R may become possible. For instance, the statement
that the number of terrorists T is typically a U-shaped function of toughness could
be reﬁn e db ye s t i m a t i n gt h elocation of the minimum and perhaps the extent of the
"upturn" after the minimum, once one considers a speciﬁc capture policy problem
with regard to a speciﬁc group with a particular sociological, historical and economi-
cal background. For example, which level of toughness against the terror organisation
Al Quaida minimises the number of new terrorists (perhaps new Al Quaida members)
in the Middle East? And if this level of toughness is exceeded, how strongly does T
rise? This is a question of the deterrence and hate eﬀect of toughness speciﬁcally for
the population of the Middle East.
Knowing relative changes suﬃces. Like a direct statistical estimation, a theory-
based estimation of absolute magnitudes may be harder than one of relative changes.
Luckily, as discussed in the previous subsection, knowledge of relative changes suﬃces
for policy optimisation, whether one estimates F directly or goes for the decomposi-
tion and estimates policy eﬀects on T and R. In a choice between only two policies 1
and 2, one may use one of the criteria of Table 2, which are based on ratios rather than
absolute magnitudes. More generally, in order to minimise F(π)=( 1−R(π))T(π) it
is suﬃcient to estimate up to a (positive) multiplicative constant the function F(π)
(resp. the functions T(π) and 1 − R(π) i fo n eg o e sf o rt h ed e c o m p o s i t i o n ) . 39 Such
estimates are obtained for instance by, for every policy π ∈ π, estimating the relative
change of F (resp. T and 1 − R) when the status quo policy is replaced by policy π,
that is, answering the question "By which percentage would F (resp. T and 1 − R)
rise or fall if policy π were implemented?"; absolute changes of F (resp. T and 1−R)
need not be estimated and can stay completely unknown.40,41
3.5 Theory-based estimation: the need to decompose F
As argued earlier, a direct statistical estimation of policy eﬀe c t s—i fp o s s i b l ea ta l l—
does not beneﬁtf r o md e c o m p o s i n gF into (1−R)T. By contrast, I now argue that a
theory-based estimation should derive policy eﬀects on F via the "indirect" strategy
of estimating policy eﬀects on the inclination and neutralisation parameters in some
suitable decomposition of F, for instance that into (1 − R)T or that given in Section
1.6. This defends the method (a)-(d) as being right in a theory-based context.
39Knowing the functions F(π) (and similarly for the functions T(π) and 1 − R(π)) u pt oam u l -
tiplicative constant means knowing that F(π)=a × e F(π) for all π ∈ π, with known function e F(π)
but unknown constants a (> 0), hence known ratios F(π2)/F(π1)=e F(π2)/e F(π1) (π1,π i ∈ π)s i n c e
a cancels out.
40The answers to these questions yields the ratio F(π)/F0 (resp. T(π)/T0 and (1−R(π))/(1−R0))
where F0,T 0,R 0 are the parameters in the status quo; and so we know F(π) (resp. T(π)/T0 and
1 − R(π)) up to a multiplicative constant, namely up to the unknown factor 1/F0 (resp. 1/T0 or
1/(1 − R0)).
41In the case of choosing between cause-related policies, both strategies (directly estimating relative
changes of F or going for the decomposition of F) are in fact formally, but not interpretationally,
equivalent. To see why, note that each policy results in the same detention rate R,i . e . w eh a v ea
constant function R(π)=R0 (see Section 1.2). So, by F(π)=( 1− R0)T(π), the functions F(π)
and T(π) diﬀer by a multiplicative constant, and hence have identical relative changes. Despite this
formal equivalence, the theory-based analysis should be interpreted as one of T,n o to n eo fF,s i n c e
it consists in estimating policy eﬀects on people’s inclination towards terrorism, for which T stands
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The aim is to estimate eﬀects of a variable X (here: the policy π)o nav a r i -
able Y (here: number of free terrorists F). By deﬁnition, a theory-based estimation
proceeds by analysing the causal mechanisms by which X aﬀects Y, i.e. by under-
standing the precise means through which this eﬀect comes about, ideally based on
empirically conﬁrmed arguments. It is advisable to cut a complex problem into more
tractable pieces, speciﬁcally into its semantically distinct components. Accordingly,
the overall eﬀect of X on Y is better theoretically understood by analysing the dif-
ferent subeﬀects or means by which X aﬀects Y .I n t h e c a s e o f e ﬀects of policies
on F, this may be achieved by subdividing policies into components (the roughest
subdivision being into cause- and symptom-related policy) and to decompose F into
inclination and neutralisation parameters (e.g. T and R), thereby allowing separate
estimation of eﬀects of each policy component on each parameter. While the choice
of the decomposition is ﬂexible, the need for a decomposition seems evident from a
theoretical perspective: F is the number of free terrorists, i.e. of persons deﬁned by
two properties of diﬀerent nature and origin: "being a terrorist" and "being not yet
captured (or already released)". Of these two properties, whether a person has the
ﬁrst is a question of his or her inclination (towards terrorism), and whether he or she
has the second is a question of how much the symptom-related policy neutralises the
terrorism threat. Speciﬁcally, inclination is measured in the present model by T, in
the model of Section 1.6 by the frequencies anf and afn (of non-terrorists becoming
free terrorists and vice versa), in even other models perhaps by diﬀerent inclination
parameters for each age group, etc. And neutralisation is measured in the present
model by R, in the model of Section 1.6 by the frequency afd of capturing free ter-
rorists, in even other models perhaps by the average time a terrorist stays free and
the average time a captured terrorist is detained, etc. Policy eﬀects on inclination
parameters may be estimated using psychological, sociological, economical, cultural,
religious, and other arguments. Policy eﬀects on neutralisation parameters may be
estimated using criminological, military, technological, infrastructural, geographical,
and other arguments. Such estimations are diﬃcult enough, but seemingly easier
than at once estimating the combined policy eﬀect on F.
4 Summary and conclusion
Let me give a summary of each section, and ﬁnish with some concluding remarks.
Section 1. To illustrate the method (a)-(d) for anti-terrorism policy choice, I have
applied it to the simple objective function of minimising the number of free terrorists
F (see Section 1.1 for the additional inclusion of costs). F was decomposed into the
product (1 − R)T, where the number of terrorists T reﬂects the group’s inclination
towards terrorism, and the detention rate R reﬂects the success in neutralising ter-
rorists’ power. Some alternative decompositions of F with perhaps more transparent
inclination and neutralisation parameters than T and R were discussed in Section
1.6. In order to reduce F =( 1− R)T, the cause-related policy reduces inclination
(T), and the symptom-related policy increases neutralisation (R). But the symptom-
related policy, which is composed of the capture policy and the punishment policy
(and the defence policy, ignored here given that the objective function F neglects how
powerful a free terrorist is), also has (side) eﬀects on inclination (T), whose overallFranz Dietrich, February 2004 29
direction is not obvious since (desirable) deterrence and (undesirable) hate eﬀects
compete against each other.
Section 2. In this section, I have focussed on choosing (some part of) the symptom-
related policy, and more precisely the "toughness level". Toughness was, for simplic-
ity, measured by a unidimensional parameter τ, which, depending on the speciﬁc
policy choice problem, may be size of an occupying army, number of airport secu-
rity checks, length of detention, size of prison cells, etc. I have analysed the typical
eﬀects that toughness has on the number of terrorists T and the detention rate R,
by distinguishing between capture policy choice, choice of length of detention, and
choice of conditions of detention. Table 1 summarises the typical shapes of R(τ) and
T(τ) and the policy recommendations suggested by these shapes. In short, capture
policy should typically be not very tough, and length of detention typically not very
short; no such recommendations were derived for conditions of detentions. Finally, I
have considered two stereotypical (but probably not realistic) cases: If people’s incli-
nation towards terrorism reacts very little to the toughness level (ﬂat function T(τ)),
minimising F(τ) is nearly equivalent with minimising the ﬁrst factor 1 − R(τ), i.e.
maximising toughness τ; and if people’s reaction to the toughness level is very strong
(V-shaped function T(τ)), minimising F(τ) is nearly equivalent with minimising the
second factor T(τ), i.e. creating the climate in which people are least inclined towards
terrorism, regardless of the capture success.
Section 3. I then turned to a methodological assessment of this strategy (a)-(d)
of policy optimisation, again by means of the example of the objective function F.
In order to estimate policy eﬀects on F, is it justiﬁed to decompose F (e.g. into
(1 − R)T) and estimate separately policy eﬀects on each parameter of the decompo-
sition (e.g. T,R)? The answer, I have argued, depends on the estimation technique.
While a direct statistical estimation of policy eﬀects on a variable (e.g. F or T or
R) is based on statistical data of how the variable responded to policies in the past,
a theory-based estimation is based on (ideally empirically/statistically tested) argu-
ments about the causal mechanisms through which policies aﬀect the variable — for
instance psychological and sociological arguments for the variable T, and criminolog-
ical and military arguments for the variable R. I have argued that a direct statistical
estimation of policy eﬀects on F or T or R is often impossible, because three standard
econometric problems are at their strongest: unprecedented policy choice, problems
in measuring F or T or R, and a lack of ceteris paribus between the past and present
situation. However, if a direct statistical estimation is nevertheless attempted, it is
probably advisable to estimate straight the eﬀects on F, because the measurement
problem may be overcome for F by using attack frequencies as indicators for the
number of free terrorists. The question of whether other decompositions of F may
be more helpful for a direct statistical estimation is left open. By contrast, if a
theory-based estimation is chosen (often the only possibility), a decomposition of F
(e.g. into (1−R)T) reduces a complex estimation problem to more manageable ones:
estimating eﬀects of the cause-related policy on inclination parameter(s), eﬀects of
the symptom-related policy on neutralisation parameter(s), and deterrence and hate
eﬀects of the symptom-related policy on inclination parameter(s). Such theory-based
estimation may go beyond the ﬁrst steps done in this paper by considering speciﬁc
policy choice questions.
Concluding remarks. Let me ﬁnish with some considerations on the endogeneityFranz Dietrich, February 2004 30
of people’s inclination towards terrorism, i.e. the fact that inclination may be inﬂu-
enced by policies. Perhaps the latter is easily overseen in reality, because it easier to
track symptom-related policy success (captures, thwarted attacks, etc.) than eﬀects
on inclination. Indeed, who can ever prove what has caused an increase or decrease
of the number of terrorists? But this does not imply that such eﬀects are inexistent
or insigniﬁcant. It might seem that the international anti-terrorism coalition after
September 11, 2001 is running a mainly symptom-related policy. Is there here an
implicit assumption that inclination is exogenous, i.e. not inﬂuenced and not inef-
faceable by policies? If it is true that the number of terrorists T is exogenous, then
there is neither a need for a cause-related policy, nor a need to care of eﬀects of the
symptom-related policy on inclination (ﬂat function T(τ)). Clearly, maximal tough-
ness would then be appropriate (in my model which neglects all costs of toughness).
But if inclination is endogenous, it may become crucial to also run a cause-related
policy and to care of eﬀects that the symptom-related policy has on inclination.
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